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Abstract 
In addressing the theme of ethics as an everyday activity. this essay makes a 
case for the primacy of preventive ethics over interventional ethics. 
Preventive ethics aims at creating a condition of viability and wellbeing for 
all members of the earth community. an ethical ideal that follows from the 
thesis that alllife~phenomena are interconnected and interpenetrating. By 
sharp contrast, interventional ethics .functions to redress the already 
accrued harm and damage that results from not paying attention, on an 
everyday basis, to the community members' bio~social~psychic conditions of 
wellbeing. This essay suggests three interlinked practices for preventive 
ethics. First, we must integrate the mind/body, self/other, and subject/object. 
Second, we must learn to value the world intrinsically, as we do in aesthetic 
appreciation. Third, we must cultivate the art of intersubjectivity in order to 
counter the prevailing habit of objectifying the other. 
Resume 
Get article porte sur la pratique quotidienne de l'ethique etfait valoir Ia pri~ 
maute de l'ethique preventive sur l'ethique d'intervention. r:ethique preven~ 
tive vise a creer un etat de viabilite et de bien~etre pour tous les habitants de 
Ia planete, un ideal deontologique qui decoule de la theorie seTon laquelle 
toutes les matieres vivantes sont intimement liees et interdependantes. En 
contraste absolu, l'ethique d'intervention cherche a redresser les torts et les 
dommages cumulatifs irifliges par la negligence quotidienne au bien~etre · 
physique, social et affectif des membres d'une collectivite. ]e suggere trois 
pratiques liees en matiere d'ethique preventive. Nous devons d'abord integr-
er la relation de l'esprit et du corps, du soi et de /'autre, et du sujet et de 
/'objet. DeUxiemement, nous devons apprendre a valoriser le monde de 
faqon intrinseque comme nous lejaisons lorsqu'il s'agit d'une critique sur le 
plan esthetique. En dernier lieu, nous devons cultiver l'art de l'intersubjec-
tivite afin de contrer l'habitude courante d'objectiver /'autre. 
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Why Ethics as an Everyday Activity 
The theme of this seminar is making ethics an everyday activity. This is a 
theme that still comes up too infrequently in philosophical discourse, 
although fortunately that is changing. In part, ethics has traditionally been 
identified with difficult, out-of-the-ordinary contexts when decision and 
action are necessitated by instances of transgression, harm, and neglect. In 
other words, ethics steps in interventionally when there is a breach of social 
norms and expectations. When we witness a moral transgression, our usual 
response is moral outrage: "That's just unforgivable. We should not let them 
get away with this. They should be punished." But in many of these trans-
gressive circumstances, the offenders may have "chosen" their particular 
course of morally culpable action because, when they came to this desper-
ate point, the "choices" they faced were between lesser or greater ills or evils. 
In these situations, damage control may be the most one can do, but even 
for that, knowledge and skills, not to mention personal virtues, are required. 
But, if people were knowledgeable, skillful, and virtuous to begin with in fac-
ing the world and its multifaceted, complex challenges, would they have got-
ten to the desperate point of seeing no choices other than those between dif-
ferent ills and evils? 
The consequence of making ethics an interventional affair requiring 
extraordinary effort to deal with difficult, hard-to-resolve life problems, like 
moral dilemmas, is that, often, the only options left are emergency measures 
that make everyone feel compromised and traumatized. Acrimonious blame 
gets passed around, and everyone is upset that the matter at hand was not 
dealt with sooner and in better ways. "How on earth have we come to this? 
Why didn't she straighten herself up sooner? Why did we let him fall apart 
like this? He should have more responsibility for himself and the situation." 
But the past cannot be undone. Situations !il{e these are moral emergencies, 
to coin a term. In analogy, a case of medical emergency, like someone hav-
ing a heart attack, requires immediate intervention, having missed the 
opportunity for proper prevention. The most we can hope to achieve in 
emergency situations is to survive the current disaster. 
We are compelled to ask, "Should emergency be most of what there is to 
ethics?" If we asked the equivalent question in the health and medicine 
field, the answer would be an unambiguous "No." In fact, many will tell us that 
any sane Medicare system should focus primarily on preventive medicine. The 
primary objective of medicine should be the promotion of good health, not the 
treatment of ill health, let alone emergency room surgery, which should be only 
a secondary objective. If the priority of prevention over intervention were 
reversed in our Medicare system (which many would say is the case at pres-
ent, unfortunately), we can be sure that our system would be in crisis. 
We can argue likewise for ethics. Ethics should primarily be about pre-
ventive moral care so as to minimize extraordinary, interventional measures 
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of justice and remediation occurring at points of conflict and harm. Moral 
heroism should be applauded but not valorized. Prevention is most effective 
when the small but significant details of everyday life are cared for, which 
contrasts with the heroic, all-out effort exerted to address massive and 
often irrevocable damage in emergency situations. When we look after 
ourselves and our situations on a daily basis, with care and knowledge, then 
we minimize the chance of people and situations falling apart, becoming 
problematic and hostile, requiring extraordinary measures of intervention; 
and, we maximize having plenty of creative and generous possibilities for 
working with and influencing the people around us and steering the course 
of events in the direction of our moral ideals. Thus, as I read it, the wish 
behind making ethics an everyday activity is, precisely, to make ethics an 
everyday practice, like eating, sleeping or exercising, wherein we take care 
of the tasks of mutual life-making while they are still small and pliable, and 
before they become, out of ignorance and neglect, desperate and intractable. 
One ounce of prevention is better than one pound of intervention. 
Ecology as a Paradigm of Everyday Ethics 
Having spoken of the importance of everyday ethics, we now come to the sub-
stantive question about the moral ideal towards which our enactment of 
everyday ethics is to be directed. What should be our moral ideal? What 
should our ethics be largely about? Do we have a viable and defensible 
ideal of what it is to lead a good life? What ideal or ideals are we aspiring to 
in our North American societies? In attempting to answer these questions, I 
am not proposing to offer demographically accurate survey data. For my pur-
pose in this paper, it is enough to present a predominant picture and discuss 
its fitness as a moral ideal for our society. The currently hegemonic ideal of 
flourishing life in North America and in much of the so-called developed and 
developing countries is relentless consumerism. This consumerism is intent 
on reducing the whole planet to a mere resource base for commodity pro-
duction that includes not only "stuff" but also all manners of commodified 
services. How well we live has come to be defined in terms of how much 
goods and services we consume. This consumption-based ideal of the good 
life is ethically very problematic because it irrevocably undermines the well-
being of the biotic communities, to borrow Thomas Berry's term (1988), and 
is increasingly threatening the viability, let alone the flourishing, of most life 
forms on the planet, including human beings.l 
That planetary viability or wellbeing should be our most comprehensive 
ethical ideal is not difficult to argue for and establish, even though it would 
take much persuading and convincing, or as we say, consciousness-raising, 
just because the population at large is still locked in a homocentric and instru-
mentalist mode of thinking that typifies the modernist industrial, economy-
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driven mind-set.z The decisive logic behind the argument that the planetary 
wellbeing should be our most comprehensive and urgent ethical ideal is pred-
icated upon the very fact of the interconnectedness and interpenetration of 
all life-phenomena on earth. We have to take the wellbeing of the whole plan-
et as our basic, comprehensive concern to be reflected in our daily life, since 
life as it is known to us is the unity of all beings, animate and inanimate, on 
this planet, existing in utter interdependence and interpenetration with 
each other. How I live in the here and now has long-term implications and con-
sequences for total strangers living on the other side of the planet. Hence, for 
human beings to lead a good life, they cannot be in disregard and in viola-
tion of the wellbeing of the whole planet. Given this, rapacious consumerism 
is a completely unethical ideal. 
Prevention at Its Best: Changing One's Mind 
It is not that many of us do not know the state of environmental degradation 
and social disintegration. Such knowledge is almost commonplace, thanks to 
media and other channels of information propagation. Information about envi-
ronmental crisis and social, moral, political malaise are readily available. Yet 
there is a striking disparity between how much and how well we know and 
what we do about this knowledge. We seem to be locked into the mode of 
thinking and pattern of conduct that precipitated the environmental and social 
crises in the first place. Among ecological thinkers and activists, there is 
increasing agreement that environmental and social problems are first and 
foremost problems of the mind. David Orr (1994) states: 
The disordering of ecological systems and of the great bio-geochemical cycles of 
the earth reflects a prior disorder in the thought, perception, imagination, intel-
lectual priorities, and loyalties inherent in the industrial mind. Ultimately, then, 
the ecological crisis concerns how we think and the institutions that purport to 
shape and refine the capacity to think. (p. 2) 
If Orr and many others who give a similar diagnosis are right about the fun-
damental cause behind the social and ecological crises we face, then I sug-
gest that we turn to philosophy as our first step in treatment. Philosophy is 
rich with resources for, and exemplary practices of, critical examination 
and conceptual revision of beliefs and values. I suggest that philosophy is the 
art of changing one's mind. Ethics from this philosophical perspective is an 
effort to re-vision the way we see and relate to the world so that the end result 
is that we live without harming each other, and, moreover, contribute to each 
other's viability and well being. In this sense, ethics is a "preventive medicine" 
in the moral dimension. In characterizing ethics this way, we can also say that 
ethics becomes the critical study of philosophy itself. Most often, it is the eth-
ical concerns we face that prompt us philosophers to critically examine the 
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guiding philosophies of the day and attempt to revise them when we find evi-
dence that the existing philosophies create and perpetuate problems. Critical 
philosophy diagnoses a civilization's malfunctioning philosophy and works 
at creatively reconceptualizing the failed or failing ontologies, epistemologies, 
and axiologies. These reconceptualizations are the proper business of criti-
cal education committed to the ideal of planetary well-being. In these edu-
cational efforts, ethics becomes both the diagnostic art and a treatment plan. 
We are at a point in history where we see so much evidence that we have 
been enacting a failed philosophy of life. I would characterize this failed phi-
losophy as alienation and disconnection-a theme most conspicuous in 
modern literature, philosophy, and psychotherapy. Human beings have 
become alienated and disconnected from each other and from the larger earth 
communities, and as a result we are egregiously destructive to each other and 
to other life forms with which we share the planet. The failed philosophy man-
ifests as multiple ideologies: logocentricism, materialism, instrumentalism, 
anthropocentricism, economism, fundamentalism, and so on. To characterize 
very briefly a few of these problematic ideologies: logocentricism privileges 
the conceptual and the discursive over the sensuous and experiential. To use 
a common expression, we come to live in our "head." Materialism reduces 
all that exists to the order of matter, that is, what occupies space; what is phys-
ically observable, quantifiable, and measurable.3 Materialism would commit 
us to undermining and even denying the whole sphere of human experience 
that lies outside the characterization of matter, such as intrinsic worth 
(sacredness), love, and compassion. Instrumentalism, which generally results 
from the abovementioned ideologies, looks at the world as composed of mere 
tools and resources for human consumption. All these ideologies combined 
render our relationship to the planet, and to its myriad biotic communities, 
objectifying, extrinsic, and instrumental. Devaluation, domination, exploita-
tion, and destruction of human beings, other beings, and the environment 
follows from our propensity to objectify the world and treat it merely as com-
posed of instruments and resources for our projects. 
My purpose in this paper is to counter these problematic ideologies by 
suggesting, although only in rough sketches, some strategies. I have three inter-
connecting strategies to offer: 
1) integration of mind and matter, mind and body, the subject and the object; 
2) intrinsic valuing wherein we value the other for what it is in itself and for itself, 
not just for what it can do or be for us; and 
3) intersubjectivity wherein we see and relate to others as subjects like oneself, 
not merely as objects existing for the self. 
I offer these three strategies as a basis for a preventive ethics of everyday activ-
ity that aims at re-creating a world of mutual and universal flourishing. 
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Integration 
Devaluation follows from seeing something as inferior to us and therefore not 
worth our utmost respect and love. Thus, preventing devaluation calls for revis-
ing our perception of things as inferior or less privileged. Now, historically, we 
have this tendency to privilege mind over matter and ro see the order of mat-
ter as inferior to the order of mind. Thus, the body is inferior to the mind; ani-
mals are inferior to humans; plants are inferior to animals; and so on. A sim-
ilar reasoning applies to the value status of children, women, people of 
colour, and the less socially privileged. These folks have historically been seen 
as less well endowed with intellect or mental faculties. This is a disturbing per-
ception because its consequence is discrimination, domination, and exploita-
tion of the people and beings who are thus negatively evaluated. One way of 
countering this disturbing perception is to resist the status quo and altempt 
to show that these unprivileged folks and creatures are just as mentally 
endowed. While this move is to be supported and promoted in many situations, 
the more radical move that can have greater potential for a more fundamental 
change is to challenge the dualistic thinking that categorically divided up the 
mental from the physical in the first place. Once the categorical division is 
made, so that mind and matter, the mental and the bodily, are substantively 
separate, then the logic behind these concepts, namely that matter lacks intel-
ligence or some sort of animating principle, and therefore is "dumb," takes us 
down the road of seeing mind to be superior to matter or body. The thing to 
do, then, is not to make the categorical division in the first place. 
The above suggestion might provoke the reaction that I am proposing an 
impossible task, for categorical thinking is built into our language itself. 
Barring the possibility of getting rid of language altogether, which is simply 
an impossibility, or less drastically, getting rid of these troubling words from 
our language, it seems there is no way we can stop seeing mind as cate-
gorically separate from matter, from body, and so on. In response, I would 
like to argue that we do not have to use language in this categorical way. 
Without discarding words l!ke "mind," "matter," and "body," "nature," "rea-
son," and so on from language, we can hear them and evaluate them dif-
ferently. But what this calls for is somewhat radical: we have to know language 
differently-to have a different working relationship with it. I am aware 
that this proposal, even were it to be worked out in detail, is a major project. 
As such, this paper is simply not the place to undertake it at this scale, but 
for my limited purpose, I can lay the simple foundation to this project: to hear 
words, like "mind," "body," "self," "object," "Nature," not as picking out some 
substantive parts of the world, that is, "entities" and "properties," but as nam-
ing qualities of experience. 
What is our usual understanding of language? Although the everyday per-
son does not use philosophical vocabulary to describe how he or she is 
using language, we will employ just a bit of philosophical vocabulary for the 
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purposes of more precise communication in this paper. The term "objectivist 
view" refers to the usual understanding of language. In this view, words refer 
to, point to, some inherent property of the world. Thus, for example, "red" 
refers to a colour understood to be an inherent property of the world: redness 
exists "out there" as a preexisting and perception-independent phenomenon. 
This way of thinking takes us down the road of seeing the world in concep-
tual categories. In philosophy, we call this metaphysical realism. The world seen 
according to this ontological lens is not composed of perception-dependent, 
and therefore co-emergent, phenomena whose meaning is open to contin-
ual re-interpretation. It is fixed, therefore discrete and substantive. Hence, 
when we encounter words in this mode of understanding, we immediately 
think that the words are picking out items that are inherently "out there in 
a preexisting and perception-independent universe." Understanding human 
cognition in this way is what we call an objectivist position in epistemology. 
The objectivist epistemology sees the world not in terms of contingent 
and emergent relationships but in terms of substantive entities and their inher-
ent properties. This view of the world is as a matter of fact a commonsensical 
one that most people entertain. But if we reflect carefully on the nature of 
experience, what makes more sense is relational ontology (Whitbeck, 1 992) 
wherein the primary "units" of reality are relationships rather than substantive 
entities. Consider the self-other binary. From the perspective of the objectivist 
~pistemology, the self is categorically separate from the other. The same goes 
for the subject-object binary. But if we pay close and careful attention to the 
logic of experience, as when we introspectively observe our experience, 
we can see that we can never catch the self or the subject independently of 
the other or the object. The same goes for other categorical binaries like emo-
tion/intellect, body/mind, Nature/culture, subject/object, and self/other. In expe-
rience, we can never separate the emotions or senses from the intellect; the 
body from the mind; Nature from culture, and so on. For instance, has any-
one experienced mind apart from body and vice versa? Mind and body, what-
ever we may want them to refer to exactly, are not separate entities. More rig-
orously speaking, they are not entities at all. For to say that something is an 
entity is to imply it is not only conceptually distinct but also ontically sepa-
rable from other entities. Have we ever been able to test this separability the-
sis? The answer, in my view, has to be a clear No, as far as experience goes. 
In experience, we can never find one independent of the other. Where one 
is, the other is, too. In Buddhist thought, this understanding is called the the-
sis of dependent origination (paticcasamuppada). 
However, if "body" is not an entity, then what is it? What are we referring 
to when we say "body"? I know that we are walking into a somewhat heady 
epistemology here, but we will go into it just slightly, only to the extent that 
we can shed some light on the present discussion. We cannot sensibly speak 
of the body in a way that is outside our experience. Body is body experienced. 
As such, when we talk about "body," we have in mind a complex of feelings, 
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sensations, emotions, and notions, all of which emerge contingently out of 
our particular physical ways of being in the world. In this sense, the body is 
not simply an entity "out there" in the world, amongst other bodies, but more . 
like a corporeal dimension of our being which is in continual interaction with 
all other dimensions. We can say something similar about "mind": that it is 
the conceptual dimension of our being. Again, "corporeal" and "conceptual" 
do not refer to some substantive entities or properties. Rather, they refer to 
certain qualities of experience. The only reason we have separate words for 
"body" and "mind" is that they refer to differentiable qualities of experience. 
In this sense, categorical terms should not be understood as picking out sub-
stantive entities or properties of the world. Rather, we should understand them 
as evoking qualities of experience, the meanings of which are always shifting 
and reconfiguring. For qualities are the moment-by-moment impressions and 
reflections in the person experiencing that emerge from a complex of sig-
nifications and interpretations he or she is immersed in. Hence our obser-
vation that experiential qualities are unstable, evanescent, and shifting. 
This section has been about integration: our philosophical effort to 
overcome the categorical thinking through our language ridden with such bina-
ries as mind-body, self-other, subject-object. Hence, insofar as ecology is a par-
adigm of everyday ethics, the cardinal step in environmental education is shift-
ing our paradigm of thought from the binary, dualistic one to an integrated, 
holistic one. The dualistic and categorical mode of thinking induces psychic 
alienation from the "entities" we project to be less privileged and inferior. 
When we realize that conceptual categories are just the lens and not reality 
itself, and, hence, that experience can be interpreted and re-interpreted 
through various lenses of our choosing for particular purposes, the spell of 
metaphysical realism and the attendant objectivist epistemology is broken. 
Freed from this spell, we see continuity or contiguity between the self and 
the other, the subject and the object, mind and matter/body, and so on. When 
we see the world in this manner, we are far more likely to feel a spirit of kin-
dredness towards all other beings with whom we co-habit on earth. We are 
the world; we are Nature; we are others; we are mindbody. 
Intrinsic Valuing 
I have named the second practice in a preventive ethics as intrinsic valuing. 
In the way I shall introduce intrinsic valuing, it can be understood as a fur-
ther extension or refinement of integration in the sense that it is an aid to inte-
gration. Instrumentalism is a hegemonic mode of perception and action that 
is devastating the world today. It is an ideology that destroys the very notion 
of sacredness or sanctity and renders everything and anything merely a 
means to some end. Typically, today, this end is an economic one. The 
whole world is being commodified. That which is merely a means is not 
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sacred, is violatable. Under instrumentalism, beings are not valued for what 
they are in themselves but only for their utility to us. For example, an instru-
mentalist looks at a giant cedar tree and sees its dollar value. He may be loo!z.. 
ing at the tree but may not see the tree. He or she values this cedar tree for 
its economic worth. To this person, there is no sense of valuing the tree for 
its own sake, that is, valuing it intrinsically, apart from its utility and profitability 
to his bank account. 
Aesthetic enjoyment of what we encounter in the world is a supreme 
example of intrinsic valuing (Bai, 2001, 2003). In aesthetic appreciation, we 
enter into a state of communion with the other, leaving aside the usual pre-
occupation with self-interest and the calculation of profit or advantage 
through the other. Whether we use the aesthetic, the spiritual, or the moral 
language to describe and explain this phenomenon of aesthetic enjoym~nt, 
the key to this phenomenon is the sense of interfusion between the self and 
the other. How does this interfusion come about? In approaching and 
encountering the other, at first there is externalization, the sense that the other 
is categorically separate and external to the self. This is a perfectly ordinary, 
"normal," perception and stance, and is not a problem in itself. However, if 
we do not move beyond this initial, limited, step and instead treat it as the 
terminus, then we will be stuck with an alienated perception of the world and 
its social and ethical consequences. But if we continue farther along the 
process, new possibilities of perceiving and relating to the world open up. To 
experience these expansive possibilities, the next step is to mount an effort 
of intense and sustained attention. For reasons of space, I will not go into the 
details of the psychological transformation that occurs at the base of con-
sciousness when we undertake this sort of attentional work.4 But basically, 
what happens is that the self finds the initial sense of alienating other-
ness, which comes from the dichotomous set-up of the self versus the 
other, to subside, but without obliterating the actual other. The result is 
what I was referring to above as the transfusion of the self with the other. 
Some other people have called it, variously, the participatory mind 
(Skolimowski, 1994); the participatory consciousness (Berman, 1981); inter-
being (Hanh, 1992); consanguinity of the self with the world (Tu, 1989), and 
so on. Often, this transfusional phenomenon is described as "losing one-
self"-an apt expression, given that one experiences a temporary suspension 
of the usual self's strong presence of interests, needs, and desires. 
Simultaneously, through this effort, the self's usual (up)tight, categorical 
boundary between the self and the other softens and becomes permeable. 
The self no longer feels that it is on this side of the window, looking out at 
the world on the other side. The ethical implication we are seeking from this 
experience is this: the state of transfused consciousness is one in which we 
have no projected design upon the other, and in which we appreciate the 
other only for what it is rather than what it should or could be to us and for 
us. In this state, it is enough that the other is here, with us, and that one is 
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beholding it and participating in its reality. As a result of one's changed epis-
temic and on tic stance, a tremendous sense of wonder, warmth, sacredness, 
and gratitude is released in oneself. 
The moral and ecological. implications of intrinsic valuing as sketched out 
above are enormous and critical for us in this age of hegemonic instru-
mentalism. At the moment, our instrumentalist desires and designs are 
consuming the whole planet. We are losing the capacity to see the world as 
a sacred other that should not be rapaciously consumed and violated. We have 
lost the sense of sacred economy wherein our consumption of the other, 
necessitated by our biological needs, is conducted as· a sacred act of com-
munion, acknowledging the other's sacrifice to keep us alive. In a society that 
practices a sacred economy, greedy and wasteful conspicuous consumption 
would be considered totally mad, if not unthinkable. 
Needless to say, the mode of intrinsic valuing is not easy to adopt when 
our whole outlook and habits are instrumentalist and consumeristic, but neces-
sity should compel us to learn and cultivate it. If we continue in our instru-
mentalist way, we will face nothing less than the irrevocable devastation of 
the whole biotic community within a very short time. It may be a matter of 
two or three decades. When forests, oceans, rivers and atmosphere go, not 
only do other life forms go, but we go, too. Hence, environmental education 
that teaches us to value the world intrinsically is a survival necessity. The view 
that many entertain, especially people in positions of power and responsibility, 
that we will pay attention to environmental issues after we have put our econ-
omy to order, that is, after we have figured out how to be economically pros-
perous, is totally preposterous. It is a grand suicidal delusion. The economy 
must follow the ecological imperative, not the other way around. What this 
means is not so much curbing or abandoning our economy as re-defining 
economy so that it is in alignment with ecology and social justice 
(Schumacher, 1999). Monetary economy is not the only economy, nor 
should it be the supreme one. We need to rekindle massively the social econ-
omy (bartering, exchanging services, and volunteer work are all good exam-
ples) and also practice a sacramental economy. Both the social economy and 
the sacramental economy (acknowledging and honouring the terrible sacri-
fice of other life forms for the sustenance of our own existence) act to bond 
the self with the other, rather than alienating them from each other as does 
the monetary economy. We must re-vision what it is to be viable and pros-
perous. Life rich in aesthetic, spiritual, moral appreciation and enjoyment, as 
opposed to expensive, wasteful entertainment and material consumption, 
should be our goal. Learning the difficult art of intrinsic valuing-for it is a sub-
tle, intricate, and arduous art-should be given priority in our formal and infor-
mal education. 
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The Art of lntersubjectivity 
Intrinsic valuing requires what I call the art of intersubjectivity. 
"Intersubjectivity" signifies the act of overcoming the subject-object dualism 
and entering into a state of subject-object communion, as briefly outlined in 
previous sections of this paper. In this section, I want to focus on how we may 
practice intersubjectivity. 
The mode of perception that externalizes the other, that is, looks at the 
other from outside, is objectivist. The other is an object for the subject, the 
self. In this mode of perception, there is every sense that a categorical bar-
rier permanently separates the two. But what is important is the realization 
that this is just one mode of perception, not the mode. Other modes exist, 
especially one that should interest us immensely: intersubjectivity. It is to be 
distinguished from the subjectivist mode that swallows up, colonizes, and con-
sumes the other. The subjectivist mode obliterates the object, whereas the 
objectivist mode completely other-izes it, making it an alien presence. In both 
cases, what is missing is the possibility of a resonance and flow of sympathy, 
whereby the subject enters into a liminal space of ambiguity and wonder. In 
this space or state, the clear and distinct categorical division between the sub-
ject and object gives away to the self's movement towards the other, and there 
emerges a sense of participation in the other's reality, a reality that is ulti-
mately a mystery. A mystery is not something to be explained away or 
solved but only to be participated in. 
The movement of consciousness I speak. of is not active in the sense of 
the self-exerting its will upon the other to penetrate it and figure it out. 
Rather, the movement of consciousness in question here is the willingness, even 
. if only provisional, to be open, engage, and participate in the emergent real-
ity of the other. But it is equally not apt to characterize this willingness as pas-
sivity or inertia. It is not passive in the sense of doing nothing and making no 
effort. It is in fact a very active process of making oneself receptive and sus-
ceptible. But instead of seeing it in the usual mode of effort-making wherein 
the self tries hard to make certain things happen, it would be more apt to char-
acterize this form of activity as entering into grace, into a space of effortless 
resonance. The Daoists have a word for this state of being: wu-wei, non-action 
or non-doing. Wu-wei feels like non-action because of the absence of self-will 
and the ego's self-interested strivings and grasping. When the ego ceases to 
strive and grasp, it does not will to do something but is willing to be there for 
whatever arises. Receptivity, not activity, is what characterizes wu-wei. 
However, l do not wish to give the impression I am arguing that being 
active or action-oriented is undesirable and needs avoiding. Activity and recep-
tivity complement each other, and it is their integration and balance that we 
need, not the privileging of one over the other. Typically, most of the time, we 
are in the mode of activity: the ego's incessant strivings and grasping. The 
ego wants to arrange the world to suit itself. The egoic mode dominates, and 
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it is this over-activity that is creating the havoc. But we should not villainize 
the ego. It is part of who we are as human beings. What is important is that 
we engage the ego in worthy pursuits but also limit it sufficiently so that it does 
not take up the entirety of the self and leave no room for grace to enter. What 
the ego can do is to will to pause itself and to stand aside so that grace or the 
mode of wu-wei can take place. I am reminded of what Reb Anderson Roshi 
once said, during one of the meditation retreats he led in Vancouver, about 
meditation and the role of the ego. Meditation's "goal" is, according to the tra-
ditional Buddhist understanding, egolessness, which basically means the same 
as the transfusion of the self and the world that we talked about previously. 
But, since egolessness is the goal of meditation, one might assume that we 
should keep ego out of the way when we set out to meditate. But, says 
Anderson Roshi, most of us do need the ego and its discursive and effortful 
capacities to successfully get ourselves to the meditation cushion. Ego has its 
particular virtues, which are the strength of will and the ability to practical-
ly calculate for risk, loss, and benefit. The point is to utilize them. We need 
the will to bring oneself to the meditation cushion, and further will to sit 
through the meditation. We also need the ego's practical intelligence that cal-
culates risks and makes choices in order to safely get ourselves to the med-
itation hall, for instance. 
In the way I have been using the term, intersubjectivity is both the prac-
tice of entering into the liminal space of grace or wu-wei and the attained state 
of consciousness wherein we do not see the world as if "out there," separate 
from oneself, but whereby we experience the co-emergence of the world-self. 
This is how Susan Griffin (1 990) illustrates the way we can understand the co-
emergent sense of perception: 
Let me take as an example the color of the flowers here on the stage. They are 
yellow. Understanding that this color derives from something that happens 
between the flower, light and my eye, or our eyes, we can say that all of us and 
the light and the flowers are in a kind of communion through which we create 
something-something we feel and name and recognize-and this is the color 
yellow. The existence of color in this way of thinking becomes a symbol not of 
alienation but of union with the earth. (p. 52) 
Not all perceptions are of the same quality. A cold and objectifying percep-
tion reduces and devalues the world, but an intersubjective, participatory per-
ception honours and adores the world, even when there is so much suffer-
ing. This mode of perception is actually well known to us, although in a 
restrictedly personal context: love. Our challenge is to extend and normalize 
this personal context of love to all of perception so that our basic mode of 
being-in-the-world is love. If we could live our lives as lovers of the world rather 
than as rapacious consumers, indeed, we would ·have succeeded in our 
effort at living the preventive ethics I have outlined in this paper. 
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Notes 
In this paper, I shall not go into any detail about the state of environmental 
degradation and world-wide social disintegration, for comprehensive and 
detailed accounts of the state of the world are readily available everywhere. 
However, I do have a particular recommendation for reading: the annual pub-
lication of State of the World by Norton Publishers is an excellent reference 
source. 
A typical response to the proposal of making environmental care and social 
justice central to human activity is this: we should look after our economy first 
and then we worry about these other causes. That many politicians and peo-
ple in responsible power positions think like this is most frustrating and dis-
heartening. 
Descartes (1985) championed the mechanical understanding of matter. This 
is how Descartes defines matter: "The nature of body consists not in weight, 
hardness, colour, or the like but simply in extension" (p. 224). By "extension," 
Descartes means "being extended in length, breadth, and depth." 
For those who are interested in exploring this transformation of the con-
sciousness, I recommend a dip into the Buddhist literature on Mindfulness 
practice, although it is certainly to be acknowledged that other psycho-spir-
itual traditions have also explored the same phenomenon of experience. 
Notes on Contributor 
Heesoon Bai is Associate Professor at Simon Fraser University in Canada. She 
teaches in Philosophy of Education, and her research interests are in ethics, 
epistemology, ecology, and Asian philosophies. She has published widely in 
academic journals and edited volumes on topics ranging from democratic edu-
cation to Zen aesthetics. Her most recent publications are in Canadian 
Review of Art Education, Paideusis, Educational Insights, and Encounter. 
Please direct correspondence to: Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser 
University, Burnaby, B.C., Canada, V5A 1S6. 
References 
Bai, H. (2003). Learning from Zen arts: A lesson In intrinsic valuation. journal of the 
Canadian Association for Curriculum Studies, 1(2), 1-14. 
Bai, H. (2001 ). Challenge for education: Learning to value the world intrinsically. Encounter. 
14(1), 4-16. 
Berman, M. (1981). The reenchantment of the world. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Berry, T (1988). The dream of the earth. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. 
Descartes, R. (1985). The philosophical writings of Descartes. U. Cottingham. R. Stootholff, 
& D. Murdoch, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
The Three l's for Ethics as an Everyday Activity 63 
Griffin, S. (1990). Daring witness: The recovery of female time. In j. Ogilvy (Ed.), Re-vision-
ing philosophy (pp. 49-59). New York: State University of New York Press. 
Hanh, T.N. (1992). Peace is every step: The path of mindfulness in everyday life. New York: 
Bantam Books. 
Orr, D. (1994). Earth in mind: On education, environment, and the human prospect. 
Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
Schumacher, E.F. (1999). Small is beautiful: Economics as if people mattered. Point Roberts, 
WA: Hartley & Marks Publishers Inc. 
Skolimowski, H. (1994). The participatmy mind. London: Arkana. 
1\.I, W. (1989). The continuity of being: Chinese visions of nature. In j.B. Callicott & R.T. Ames 
(Eds.), Nature in Asian traditions of thought (pp. 67 -78). Albany: State University of New 
York Press. 
Whitbeck, C. (1992). A different reality: Feminist ontology. In A. Garry & M. Pearsall (Eds.). 
Women. knowledge. and reality. (pp. 51-73). New York: Routledge. 
64 Heesoon Bai 
